My Essay on the Necessity of Free Will in Morality

My maiden post betrays my purpose of this blog as a means rather than as an ends. Immanuel Kant would be ashamed of this adherent of his, be it as it may that this blog possess not a rational mind in itself beyond what one attributes to it out of charity. An empty page is naught but a mirror for his master's gaze. Does this not mean that I treat harshly what is in effect my own consciousness, in an act of self-flagellation?

Far be it for such an amateur hobby philosopher to indulge in his mad lonely rants thinly-veiled as a soliloquy, one shall now put this blog's raison d'etre into commission: as naught more than a place to taxi my thoughts and cabinet my essays. The first one shall serve a purpose, nay two: to act nobly as a utility of reference; and to stand as a pillar of effort laid low by chance and repression, obliquely ironic in view of its content.

How unfair does it stand, that my work, forged through the blistering fires that raged within my eyelids and labours extended far beyond the calls of many a night's rest, should be discounted for just tawdry a misunderstanding of policies? Submitted electronically within time, the hard-copy I imagined to be passed on the next class like all my other classes in Government, but lo, how was I mistaken.

For my blind oversight, I am punished full measure; for my dedication and refusals at Morpheus' many calls, I receive nothing. To the dredges of posterity, then, shall I cast my essay, my rather darling essay.

PY408 Fall Term Essay

Is Free Will Necessary for Morality?

By

Morality sets a standard to which one should act and this fact infers that anyone who falls short of this standard should be morally censured while those who exceed it is rewarded with praise. Determinism proclaims that all actions and all events are driven, not willed upon. Put together, it would seem absurd to blame a man whose actions are not his as it is to praise a stone in its fall to the ground, so is free will necessary for one to be moral?

This essay shall attempt to shed light on the issue. It will begin by stating the fundamentals of the popular modern moral ethea to form the base upon which the question may rest. In the second part, the essay will discuss the topic of free will and determinism through the arguments of the supporters of compatibilism and those against it, before introducing, hopefully, an adequately lucid method of cross-tabulating the relations between the moral doctrines and free-will and proving the weakness and irrationality of any attempt to assign blame at all, in the manner of a Kantian.

II

Being moral is an endeavour considered both noble to pursue and elusive to grasp. Countless philosophers and priests opined and extolled their own sets of virtues or threw their support behind another’s, accentuating the fact that behaving well is often difficult to accomplish.

The main dispute lies within the very nature of morality itself. Morality is strictly inessential. To be sure, the thought of behaving immorally conjures up onerous images but immorality exists only when morality does, the latter forming the back upon which immorality is slung. The absence of morality leaves us not with immorality, but amorality; a position to which some would still find as horrid but many would see that it truly confers no connotations either way. This ‘amoral-ness’ will be visited upon again late in the essay.

Contemporarily, the two main theories (an arguable statement, though philosophers do tend to be predisposed to arguing) of morality are consequentialism and deontology, both occupying the two opposite ends of appraising moral conduct. The former stresses results in determining the morality of actions, while deontology focuses on intentions and duty.

Consequentialism is best portrayed by Mill’s Utilitarianism. In finding the best and most moral course of action, one would weigh the benefits and costs of all alternatives and choose the one which offers the most utility expressed in total amounts of happiness. Without being said, utilitarianism requires one to be able to both quantify abstract concepts, such as happiness and suffering, and to be able to reasonably predict future outcomes from ones potential actions with sufficient accuracy. While both of these presumptions, at least in a personal opinion, stretch heavily against the doctrine, the theory is not without its attractions. By reducing morality to mathematics, it offers a measurable way to conduct oneself morally, and it is thus easier for one to judge oneself and others.

The other alternative is deontology, the ethics of the rightness of actions and of duty. Mostly made renowned by Immanuel Kant and his Metaphysics of Morals, deontology examines not the results of ones actions in order to declare it moral but instead looks upon the intentions that led up to its performance. To this end, duties and maxims which are moral are to be constructed and obeyed, even to the point where morally reprehensible results are reached where either it is attributed to a faulty maxim or an unfortunate but inevitable circumstance.

To ascertain the morality of the maxims, Kant created the test of universability and the law of means and ends. In them, men will shed their compliance with externally-, and arguably subjectively-, imposed morality and become legislators in their own right of laws in ‘the kingdom of ends’. Each man will treat another as not a means to an end, but every rational being as an end in itself, and commit actions only so long as it is excusable for him to imagine another person to do morally commit them as well. This of course led to the thought of absolute moral values to adhere to. In such a case, the virtue ethics of the ancient philosophers can also be classed as such.

A more modern doctrine in regards to morality is of morality being nothing more than a social construct. The writings of Rawls in his Theory of Justice treated men as signatories to a social contract, and it can be said that morals are the values that the society upholds and nothing more. This in turn leads to the idea of moral relativism, the antithesis to absolute morals. In such a manner, can any action be judges moral, free will or none?

III

Now that the essay has outlined the basic doctrines on morality and how they judge action by, we can return to the original question: ‘Is free will necessary to be moral?’ At a glance, the intuitive answer would be “yes, it must”. For a person to be judged to have acted morally, one would need to assume that he must have had made a moral choice, and choices, as a rule must represent at least two alternatives to be considered as such[1]. Therein lays the other kink in the question that needs to be straightened.

A theory arises, from both religious texts and advances in psychology, that instead of free will, the actions of the world are determined by factors beyond the agent’s control. Even the purview in the illusion of choice is determined by factors such as desire and even by the tiny movements of atomic particles. The extent to which one accepts the degree of free-will and determinism created two positions: the Compatibilist and the Incompatibilist.

The Compatibilist insists that there can indeed be compatibility between free will and deterministic events, even though it may seem to fly against the face of free choice. Surely for one to choose, it must mean that one must be presented with an option between two choices bearing different results? If the relation between the causes and effect is one-one, implying a deterministic relation, then how can one be faulted for damages or praised for virtue?

To get around this, Harry Frankfurt argues that while the result is determined, the intentions that lead up to it does not[2]. A man is free to ‘want to want to do [an action]’; free to will, hence free will, even though the results may not owe an iota to his intentions. This motive perhaps finds its roots in religious doctrines from which springs forth another sort of determinism: Pre-determinism.

The Incompatibilist will argue against this by stating that no moral judgment can be passed as long as the Causal History Principle is in place (in that any and all prior actions will lead up to one and only one particular event) and that for someone to be vindicated, she must be able to change, at the point in time when she makes her will, the whole causal history to effect her choice, which is impossible since all causals are alien-deterministic[3]. This essay, too, has a similar conclusion but by a different method presented later in the essay. At any rate, this argument is likely to be presented by the Incompatibilist of the ‘Hard-Determinist’ persuasion who believes strongly that determinism outside the agents’ control play an overriding part in the events and choices of men. This alien-determinism naturally forms the conclusion that in no act can a man be blamed or praised, as this essay’s model will also attempt to prove later on.

The other branch of philosophers who believe in the incompatibility between free will and determinism are the Libertarians. To them, determinism holds much less sway than free will, believing that agents can choose to act without being causally determined by unchangeable factors. This position will oddly occupy the same Kantian position as the Compatibilists as the a priori friendliest system to the Libertarians, Consequentialism, will prove to be the most rubbish moral doctrine.

IV

All the arguments put forward by the defenders of each doctrine involves presumptuous examples of moral dilemma and obfuscating arguments bordering on the pedantic, both approaches, though indispensable and un-dismissable, I will choose to abandon in this essay for want of clarity, lucidity and perhaps a fresh approach. This is a simple model of eight boxes, analysing the relationship between intentions and results[4].

		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
(i)	Consequence	T	T	F	F
(ii)	Intention	T	F	T	F

In the above schedule T implies a favourable action or result, and F an unfavourable one.

Here we have the basic connection between what one wills, and what happens after. In (a) we can see that our agent has chosen to commit himself to an intention favourable to him and his conscience, a ‘good’ choice, which is synonymous with what the agent thinks is a moral act and hence does not go against his personal maxims or convictions. We can see that in the case of (a), the consequence of his conduct is favourable, both to him and whomsoever the consequence effects (see below). Thus, in a normal situation, his actions come under no scrutiny either from himself or from those around him, simply because he has done nothing wrong. It is vice versa with the case of (d) where the agent’s bad intentions led to a bad outcome, for which he can understandably be reprimanded for.

It needs to be clarified that for the intentions or consequence to be good and favourable, it doesn’t need to grant a benefit to those involved. It is merely enough for it to cost or disgust them less than the alternative so that it is a more appealing option in comparison to the dearer alternative, in a very much of a utilitarian manner. Likewise, a deliberate difference in the portrayal of consequences and intentions is the public nature of the consequence, as opposed to the more private intentions, a matter which will be touched on later.

The nomenclature becomes less tepid once we realise that the schedule corresponds with the two moral doctrines we have observed in the beginning of the essay. Consequentialism concerns itself with actions which lead to beneficial consequences and thus identifies with row (i) and advocates actions in which there is a value T within the row. Likewise, deontology is identified with row (ii) and in turn advocates actions in which there is a value T within its respective row. Hence we see that Mill’s doctrine permits the events of (a) and (b), while Kant’s doctrine permits events (a) and (c).

At this juncture, we introduce the assumption that it is morally unacceptable to have mismatched intentions and consequences. Intuitively, we cannot accept the moral result of such a mismatch as readily as we accept a righteous man rewarded (a) or a sly man caught (d). True, if one were to adhere to one doctrine or the other, this persuasion may result in one having more clarity as to which choice has comparative advantage, but surely one would not wish upon another the scenario which forces him to save one innocent young girl from an oncoming train in place of ten errant boys. As such we can say that a mismatch between the T and F values of rows (i) and (ii) will result in a moral dilemma which otherwise would not have occurred.

V

However, the schedule above is misleading. It makes no partition between what one would know and what one normally wouldn’t, as if men could judge a person’s intentions or have foreknowledge of future events like an omniscient god. The schedule did not take into account the effects of time and uncertainty.

Conceptualise a timeline for our agent, with the exact point whence he sets his intention and proceeds to act as time t. Subsequently, we can assign the point in time at which the agent mulls his intention as time (t-1) and the moment the result from his action manifests itself as time (t+1). To be prudent of the word limit, in the same schedule, we will also include the social factor, the “others” externally who judge the agent.

		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
(i)	Consequence	T	T	F	F	?	?	T	F
(ii)	Intention	T	F	T	F	T	F	?	?

This schedule is the same as the earlier one above, but with the ‘?’ mark referring to a factor unknown. All of the new four columns share a common feature, though not in the same context.

For our agent at time (t-1), he can’t be said, when push comes to shove, to know what his intended actions will produce at time (t+1). We thus encounter one of the problems with consequentialism that the essay mentioned earlier. One cannot consistently base ones future actions on the future results that one cannot reliably predict and still maintain that that system is stable.

Logically and strictly speaking, at time (t-1) our agent cannot use utilitarianism to determine his course of action because he cannot assign any value to the consequence of any of his actions with certainty. He can certainly make a guess or a prediction but no one will claim that the results are a certainty. No one, that is, apart from the determinist, but even she cannot say what will occur, merely that it is set and unchanging.

Kantians would find no trouble at time (t-1). In fact, it simplifies Kantianism so much that in fact it removes any possibility of having a moral dilemma by encouraging our agent to have good intentions by making F an irrational choice, though still leaving our agent the option to choose it irregardless. Aside, by assigning an equal value to both the consequences of (e) and (f), this becomes the Compatibilists’ proof by Frankfurt mentioned earlier which perhaps shows that determinism and Kantianism do not disprove each other. As it stands, this is one argument that supports the idea that free choice (and thus free will) is unnecessary to Kantianism and perhaps to morality, too.

At time (t+1) our agent of course is now privy to the results of his actions, but to apply consequentialism at this juncture on his previous decision is pointless and retroactive.

However, (g) and (h) do measure consequentialistically. It is the retrospective part of our agent at time (t+1) held independent of his own knowledge of his previous intentions. Consequently this is how consequentialists externally judge the actions of others and how philosophers often approach moral dilemmas, falsely in the author’s opinion, because they know the intentions of time (t-1) with even less certainty than the Kantian knows about the future.

Take for example, a thief caught in the act. Certainly, the act is wrong and deserves condemnation and perhaps some would go to the extent of vilifying him. This corresponds to (h). If they were to know that he stole food to feed his hungry children then some of them would certainly consider it a moral dilemma, corresponding with (c).

What differs (h) and the seemingly comparable (f) is the timeline. The results of intentions are truly unknowable and this uncertainty plays a role in helping to form the action. In comparison, the events of (h) are done and the only uncertainty is not due to time but of un-enlightenment. No one, for example, would know about how our agent sacrificed an old woman to save a child in a burning home if no one knew and he never told. If our agent feels later on that it was against his convictions, then he’ll be in a moral dilemma (b) but it would be confined only to him, expressed perhaps in the form of remorse or guilt. To the outsider without the agent’s knowledge of the decision at (t-1), he would judge matters as (g), and think nothing more of it.

VI

We shall now insert our final factor, determinism, into the schedule. Assuming that determined events are blameless, the symbol (-) shall represent the factors made immaterial.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(i)

Consequence

T

T

F

F

?

?

T

F

T

F

-

(ii)

Intention

T

F

T

F

T

F

?

?

-

-

-

We can see that if events at time (t-1) are determined [for which now ‘intentions’ become a misnomer], represented by (i) and (j), consequentialism is vindicated. At moment (t+1) the consequentialist judgment would be whole and correct. However, the scenario, while not impossible to happen, it is unlikely for the simple reason that it can only happen once in a universe previously deterministic because Causal History is now broken at time t. One can comment snidely that this is the single moment that consequentialism is not made invalid.

At this final point, it is prudent to make a final distinction between (e)-(f) Kantianism and Hard-Determinism. The former (in itself) tolerates the Compatibilist argument if determinism is true, but even if determinism is disproved, (e)-(f) Kantianism survives where Compatibilism doesn’t. Hard-Determinism forces upon us through its definition given earlier, the scenario (k). If consequences are determined, then at no time can any previous decisions be anything more than superfluous consequentialistically. Kantianism simply doesn’t give a toss.

VII

In conclusion, is free will necessary?

If you insist on having morality, then it depends on which yardstick you choose to measure with. Consequentialism requires free choice (to be more precise, it cannot accommodate any position of determinism apart from the one moment mentioned above) and hence must presuppose free will. Deontology finds free will inconsequential and unnecessary. Given the bad show the former has done in the model, one can freely dismiss consequentialism which leaves free will ultimately as unnecessary. It is a shame that for want of words this essay could not go on a polemic to argue for the amorality instead settling for the one by Hard-Determinists, which is sufficient enough.

(3003 words)

Bibliography

1. Ayers, M.R. The Refutation of Determinism (Methuen & Co.; London) 1968
2. Kant, I. translated by Gregor, M. The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) 1991
3. Norman, R. The Moral Philosophers (Oxford University Press; Oxford) 1998
4. Pereboom, D. Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) 2001
5. Rawkin, K.W. Choice and Chance (Basil Blackwell; Oxford) 1961
6. Wegner, D.M. The Illusion of Conscious Will (Bradford Books; London) 2002

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[1] Ayers, M.R. The Refutation of Determinism (Methuen & Co.; London) 1968 p.2

[2] Pereboom, D. Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) 2001 p. 101

[3] Ibid. p. 48

[4] This table takes inspiration from a Determinism-Free Will table by Strawson in Pereboom, D. Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) 2001 p. xix.